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West Papua in revolt 
Many flee from Indonesian reprisals 
Papuan deserters from the Indonesian army await news of their fate in Vanimo, PNG. (Photo: The Age, 16 March 1984) 
At the beginning of February, the OPM launched a number of attacks on Indonesian installations around Jayapura, which were 
followed by fierce fighting between OPM guerrillas and Indonesian troops. The first reports of this new outbreak of resistance to 
Indonesian rule came as hundreds of West Papuan refugees fled from Jayapura across the border into Papua New Guinea. At the tim,e of 
the fighting, General Benny Murdani, the Armed Forces Commander was on an official visit to Vietnam, but in his place Defence 
Minister General Poniman rushed to Jayapura to make an assessment of the situation. In recent weeks, the atmosphere there has become 
increasingly tense, especially with mass arrests and house-to-house searches by the security forces . The presence of KOPASSANDHA 
(paracommando) troops in Jayapura since late last year suggests that Indonesia has been expecting trouble to break out. In the past, the 
Op M has been hampered by internal divisions, but recently the two main factions issued a joint statement to work together in the fight 
against Indonesian rule. 
With travel to Jayapura now severely restricted and independent 
reports of events hard to come by (BBC World Service, 17 March 
1984), accounts of what has happened there vary in some respects 
but it has been possible to piece together a reasonably consistent 
picture. An attack on Jayapura had long been under preparation 
but the date was brought forward following the arrest of a number 
of West Papuans late last year. (See TAPOL Bulletin No . 61 , 
January 1984.) The need to act became even more pressing when 
Indonesia bombs PNG territory 
On 26 March, Indonesian aircraft and PNG and ground troops 
attacked locations inside PNG territory, around the village of 
Green River where refugees from West Papua are situated . 
PNG Prime Minister , Michael Somare , has made a strong 
protest to Indonesia about this violation of PNG sovereignty, 
and about Indonesian military activity in the border area . 
Harassment of ex-tapols intensified PAGE 1s 
West Papua 
one of the prisoners, Asser Demotekai, a re tired government 
official, was shot dead by his captors, leading to fears for the 
safety of the other prisoners. 
During the last quarter of 1983, conditions were already very 
tense because Indonesian troops were conducting "Operation 
Clean-up" (Operasi Tumpas) in the region of Lake Sentani , to 
prevent villagers from cultivating gardens far from their villages. 
The Army suspects villagers of using these gardens to contact and 
supply food to the guerrillas. The murder of a villager named 
Membri (or Mebri)-see TAPOL Bulletin No . 61 , January 
1984--happened during this operation . 
9th February: First incidents occurred in Jayapura. Conflict 
erupted over prices between Serui Papuans and Makassarese 
Indonesians , in Hamadi market , with the result that 3 Papuans 
were killed , adding to an already tense atmosphere "as if there 
were a state of war" (Tempo, 10th March) . Full state of alert 
(Siaga 1) was declared by the Army, and about 100 Papuans in 751 
Battalion deserted, because their plan to attack Jayapura and 
raise the West Papuan flag on 11th February was discovered by 
security forces. An army corporal who deserted said that the 
OPM had intended to sabotage Sentani Airport, the harbour , 
electricity, fuel and military installations, and that when 
discovered, "we , the Melanesians in the army, about 100 of us , 
fled with shotguns, rifles and ammunition into the jungle" (Post-
Courier, 20th Feb.). According to Tempo, they also took 
communications equipment with them, and staff from 
Cendrawasih University and Jayapura hospital fled with medical 
supplies. 
11th February: OPM stormed Abepura prison and freed all 
political prisoners, including Arnold Ap. It seems they were not 
taken over into PNG, as the area from Abepura to the PNG 
border is now under OPM control. (Nederland Dagsblad, 13th 
March .) 
12th February: Japayapura radio station was put out of action, 
and according to one report (Nederlands Dagblad 13th March) 
"blown up". OPM sources report that their forces took control of 
the station for a day and were able to broadcast reports about 
uprisings in other cities. 
13th February: An OPM guerrilla tried to raise the West Papuan 
flag in front of the D PR Regional Assembly building, but was shot 
dead while it was only half-way up. A Papuan working in the 
building, who had given the guerrilla access to the ffag pole, was 
also shot dead , and it is thought that several people may have died 
in subsequent shooting. 
15th February: OPM units in Biak put Mokmer Airport out of 
action, and military installations were attacked and put out of 
action in Sarong and Manokwari . (Ned. Dag. 13th March .) 
During the following week, Indonesian troops conducted 
house-to-house searches, arrested hundreds of Papuan civil 
servants and army deserters, and imposed a dusk-till-dawn 
curfew. It is reported that 3,000 troops were flown in from Ambon 
(PNG Times, 1st March), and that helicopters and ground forces 
have been active around Jayapura and on the border in the hunt 
for OPM guerrillas and army deserters. (Post-Courier, 21st 
February.) All contact with Jayapura was lost after the attacks ; 
even the Indonesian Embassy in Port Moresby admitting it could 
not get through , and the OPM claims to have destroyed telephone 
and telex communications from Jayapura to Biak, Jakarta, 
Vanimo and Port Moresby. It is not certain to what extent fighting 
continues around Jayapura, but the state of full alert was 
maintained until 2nd March (Tempo, 10th March). One West 
Papuan described the OPM operations as "the biggest thing ever 
attempted by our forces, the first time such an attack has gone into 
the town of Jayapura itself" (Post-Courier, 15th February) . 
The attacks in Jayapura were led by 0. Joweni of the 
Rumkorem faction , J. Hembrin of the Prai faction, and by J . 
Awom, who was formerly second-in-command of a Mobile 
Brigade unit of the Indonesian Army. The OPM may have 
intended a larger scale attack for 11th February, and perhaps a big 
Wome~reedom-fighters and mothers-at an OPM headquarters inside West Papua. (From an article by Neville Togarewa, in PNG Times, 15 March, 1984) • 
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show of strength in March, but the Indonesian discov~ry of these 
plans prevented them from materialising. In the event, the OPM 
was able to call upon 500 reinforcements from the border area 
and says i~ c~rried out war operations in Sarong, Fak-Fak'. 
Manokwan, Biak and Wamena. AccordiQg to Robin Os.bourne 
(The Age, 15th March), PNG intelligence estimates that there are 
1,000 OPM guerrillas operational in Jayapura province alone. 
Many Papuans seek refuge in PNG 
The first refugees began to arrive on 9th February, and their 
numbers have continued to grow ever since. Most came by boat 
from Jayapura and landed in Vanimo, capital of the PNG 
province of Sandaun on the border. By the first week of March 
there were over 300 refugees in Vanimo alone, and they reported 
that there were 2,000 more West Papuans waiting to come across 
the border. It is not yet known how many may already have 
crossed the border at other points by walking, since there have 
been no specific reports from different border posts, but the 
.• Provincial Secretary of Sandaun, Melchior Kapaitch, has felt it 
'necessary to suspend all"further crossings, even by those who do 
so regularly. The refugees are mainly people from the town of 
Jayapura, some of whom left members of their families behind. 
They came with next to no possessions, which seems to indicate an 
unplanned departure, and among them were a few OPM 
guerrillas and Papuans, deserters in Indonesian army fatigues. 
All the refugees have clearly been very frightened of the 
fighting in Jayapura, and their accounts suggest that there have 
been serious clashes between the OPM and the Indonesian forces. 
They are more frightened of reprisals by Indonesian troops when 
they conduct house-to-house searches for OPM guerrillas, with 
good reason, because in the past those suspected of crossing the 
border illegally or of being sympathetic to the OPM have been 
subjected to harsh punishments when forced to return. When he 
spoke with the first refugees, Mr Kapaitch commented, "I don't 
know if it's real fighting, but something has scared them. They're 
terrified" (Australian, 14th February) . 
Indonesian pressure on PNG 
The Indonesian government is exerting considerable pressure on 
PNG to hand back the refugees, and has in several cases floated 
claims that the PNG government has already agreed to do so. The 
BBC World Service (17th March) quoted officiaJs in Jakarta as 
saying that "295 people who crossed the border . . . would be 
returned", that the people who crossed "were ignorant of 
immigration procedures or had crossed the border 
unintentionally", adding that reports in the foreign press about 
unrest in Irian Jaya, were "all lies". According to Cairns radio 
(21st March), the PNG government has allowed a number of the 
refugees to remain in PNG because they face the risk of being 
killed if they are handed over to the Indonesians. 
The refugees have received widespread sympathy among 
Papuans in PNG, but less so from the PNG government. Prime 
Minister Michael Somare is anxious not to upset the Indonesians 
by appearing to take the present situation too seriously, and 
police have been ordered to arrest all the male arrivals from West 
Papua. Already 84 people have been charged with itlegal entry 
and have pleaded guilty, which makes them liable to be fined, 
imprisoned or deported. The refugees have had to live in 
conditions described as "not fit for humans to live in", and have 
recently been forced to move camp much further from facilities in 
Vanimo. The UN High Commission fot Refugees has recognised 
their plight and offered equipment and thousands of dollars of 
aid, but their fate has yet to be decided by the PNG government. 
There is a great deal of controversy over West Papua in PNG, 
where the population tends to feel a strong affinity with their 
"cousins" over the border. Many people in PNG are highly critical 
of their government's policy towards West Papuan refugees, all of 
which is reflected in the PNG media. University students are 
raising money for refugees because they support the OPM quite 
openly, and some lawyers insist that West Papuans fleeing from 
Jayapura must be regarded, according to international law, as 
refugees and not charged as criminals. The Public Solicitor's 
Office has questioned the legality of ordering police to arrest the 
refugees, and the lack of proper legal representation for those 
who have already pleaded guilty, and who now wish to change 
their pleas to not guilty . 
UN role urged 
An OPM spokesman in Port Moresby, Henk Yoku, has called for 
a UN peace keeping force to intervene in West Papua. Opposition 
MPs have called on Somare to raise the West Papuan issue at the 
next UN General Assembly and in the Decolonisation 
Committee. Somare has offered to mediate under certain 
conditions between Indonesia and the OPM, but Indonesia never 
accepts such offers, and will not aknowledge the existence of the 
OPM, so he is unlikely to be able to satisfy his opponents in that 
way. 
The Indonesian attitude to recent events in West Papua has 
also caused great concern in PNG. Under the terms of the border 
agreement between the two countries, Indonesia ought to keep 
PNG informed of any important developments in West Papua; yet 
Indonesia not only maintained a conspicuous silence, while 
hundreds of refugees poured into PNG and Indonesian 
helicopters and troops hounded Papuan guerrillas right on the 
border, but the PNG government was unable to get a response 
from either the Indone~ian Embassy or the Foreign Minister, 
Mochtar KusumaatmadJa. The PNG Times wrote bitterly in its 
editorial of the 8th March: 
The arrogance of the Indonesian Foreign Minister in refusing for a 
week t~ speak to Mr Namaliu (PNG Foreign Minister) was distressing 
but entuely expected. 
This high-handed attitude towards PNG has only increased 
Papuans' mistrust of Indonesia's intentions regarding their 
c~untry, but the prevailing fear of Indonesian military strength 
d~ctates that the PNG government will try to downplay its 
differences with the Suharto regime over West Papua. 
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Transmigration plans for 
West Papua 
Indonesia's fourth five-year plan-Pelita 
IV-which runs from 1984/85 to 1988/89 
and commences on 1 April provides for a 
huge increase in the number of transmig-
rants to West Papua, now known in In-
donesia as the province of "lrian Jaya". Ac-
cording to a report of the Irian Jaya Direc-
torate for Transmigration to the Minister 
for Transmigration and Manpower in Oc-
tober , the number of families to be trans-
ported from Java to Irian Jaya during Peli ta 
IV will exceed 200,000-203,250 to be 
exact-a total of roughly a million people. 
This compares to 8,831 families transported 
throughout Pelita I and Pelita II and the 
first three years of Peli ta III. 
The document, a copy of which recently 
came into T APO L's hands, contains two 
maps showing the spread of transmigration 
sites up to 1982 and the planned expansion 
up to 1989. There is no doubt that if these 
plans are realised, the face of West Papua 
will change dramatically. The target figure 
of 203,250 families for lrian Jaya may have 
been scaled dqwn since 1982. The report 
gave the overall target for the whole coun-
try as a million families but statements in 
the Indonesian press more recently refer to 
a new figure of 750,000 families , the result 
apparently of a departmental meeting some 
time in 1983. However, an analysis of trans-
migration to Merauke, the main growth 
area in Irian Jaya, published in the 
fortnightly Mutiara (see TAPOL Bulletin 
No. 61, January 1984, page 3) still gave a 
target figure of 127 ,000 families for that reg-
ion alone. 
Irian Jaya has now become the primary 
target for transmigration from Java. Some 
parts of Sumatra, formerly the primary 
target, are becoming so densely populated 
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that they are turning into regions for out-
ward rather than inward migration. As a re-
sult Sumatra is likely sooner or later to be 
closed to transmigration from Java. This 
tends to be the trend too in North and South 
Sulawesi with the result that "central and 
eastern Indonesia will be the main target 
areas in Peli ta IV. Irian Jaya will need as 
many people as possible to populate the 
three provinces into which the territory is 
soon to be divided". (Sinar Harapan, 14th 
January , 1984.) 
The October 1982 report states that with 
the construction of two major highways, 
from Nabire to Ilaga and from Jayapura 
through Oksibil to Merauke, the numerous 
transmigration sites will become centres for 
. 
' 
' 
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economic growth, the so-called "'growth 
poles' that can develop dynamically, prom-
oting more rapid growth of Irian Jaya in all 
sectors" . Transmigration sites will be di-
rected towards food production, the culti-
vation of plantation crops, animal husban-
dry' sea and inland fisheries as well as in-
dustrial activity. But there will also be what 
the report refers to as "transmigrasi sap-
tamarga". Saptamarga is the doctrine of the 
Indonesian Armed Forces; in other words, 
sites will also be populated by members of 
the Armed Forces and their families where 
the emphasis is primarily on security. 
TRANSMIGRATION SITES PLANNED BY 1988 
These "saptamarga" transmigration 
sites are to be concentrated along the bor-
der with Papua New Guinea, in particular 
along the northern sector, to help seal off 
the region of Jayapura where the West Pa-
puan liberation movement, the OPM, is 
known to be particularly strong. This is 
where refugees have been fleeing from 
military terror since early February. A vast 
palm-oil nucleus estate is to be established 
along the west bank of the Arso river, cov-
ering an area of 21,000 hectares. According 
to the bulletin of the Irian J aya Develop-
ment Information Service (Kabar dari 
Kampung, No. 3-4, August 1983, page 12), 
300,000 transmigants are due to settle a 
short distance to the north in Koya in ,the 
coming ten years. Conversion of forest land 
to the cultivation of esta,te crops will elimi-
nat(\ sago stands and hunting grounds, thus 
making the local population dependent for 
the first time on outside food supplies and 
depriving guerrilla fighters of the source of 
sustenance. 
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Three provinces 
The plan to create three provinces in Irian 
Jaya is closely linked to these transmigi"a-
\ West Papua and transmigration 
•'1; - i 
tion plans. The vast distances in the territ-
ory mean that more first-level administra-
tive centres are required. Ineffective ad-
ministrative control has been an important 
factor keeping the rate of transmigration 
well below .target. But there are other obs-
~acles which could stand in the way of realis-
mg the Pelita IV target; acquiring enough 
suitable land for the sites, preparing the 
land for cultivation and providing the neces-
sary infrastructure, particularly road con-
struction. But the authorities appear deter-
mined not to allow these difficulties to deter 
I 
them. Many instances have come to light 
where foreign consultancy firms have pro-
duced unfavourable feasibility reports, only 
to be over-ruled by a decision to go ahead 
with a transmigration site regardless. 
The requirements of the local popula-
tion whose agricultural habits are so diffe-
rent from the new patterns of cultivation 
being imposed do not get so much as a men-
tion in official transmigration plans. The 
only reference in the October 1982 report to 
the local population refers to the require-
ment that they "merge" or "assimilate" into 
the new sites where , according to the target , 
25 per cent of inhabitants should be "trans-
locals" . No Papuans hold posts of any sig-
nificance in the administrative staff of the 
transmigration programme. Of the 357 
people employed by the province's Directo-
rate for Transmigration,only 27 are "put era 
daerah" or "people from the region". 
None is higher than civil service Grade Ila 
which means they are at most low-grade 
clerical staff, far removed from any say in 
planning or execution. 
*About a million people 
Transniigration a top priority 
On the face of it, there is reason to doubt whether such ambitious 
transmigration plans have any hope of succeeding. The chances of 
transporting a million people to lrian Jaya in the next five years, 
considering progress so far, would appear to be remote. But the 
government claims that the national Pelita UI target of 500,000 
families was achieved in late 1983, several months ahead of 
schedule. 
There is a sense of increasing urgency about the transmigration 
programme in Indonesia as population pressure mounts in Java 
bringing in its trail of social problems that are clearly becoming 
unmanageable. The death-squad killings and plans to introduce a 
law on compulsory transportation of people are also part of the 
Army's "solution". Transmigration is increasingly seen as the 
"safety valve" for Java. Some analysts forecast that Java will be-
come a "city island" with a population density of 1000 per square 
km by the end of this century unless transmigration is accelerated . 
Some idea of the social chaos that already grips East Java is 
given in an article in Sinar Harapan (11th February, 1984) which 
describes the alarming rate of urbanisation not only in Surabaya 
butin all the towns and cities of the province. New industrial com-
plexes which had been intended to "syphon" population pressures 
away from the older conurbations have now become overbur-
dened with the influx of people driven by acute landlessness and 
poverty to abandon the villages. The concentration of land owner-
ship and the conversion of much land to industrial use is a key fac-
tor: 
For owners of riceland and dry land whose land is taken over, compen-
sation is usually paid though some owners are cheated by those in 
power to relinquish their property at dirt-cheap prices . But farm 
labourers, people who herd cattle and others lose absolutely every-
thing whereas the towns offer them nothing either because they lack 
the necessary skills and need to adjust to very different circumstances. 
In Surabaya, spaces under bridges, near railway carriages in stations, 
along the banks of the Brantas-Kalimas river and around market stalls 
are filled with people who possess nothing at all-not to mention the 
prostitution complexes which spread day by day . 
Sinar Harapan, 11th February 1984. 
According to the 1980 census, writes SH, there were 2,376,958 
people seeking jobs in East Java. 
Forced transmigrants coerced into marrying 
One of the methods now being used by the social services is to 
force these deprived people to transmigrate . But transmigrants 
must be part of a family unit so there is additional coercion on 
people to marry so as to comply with the requirements. A report 
in Topik (20th December, 1983) describes a mass marriage or-
ganised by the Department for Social Affairs in Trenggalek, East 
Java, in preparation for transmigration to Irian Jaya. Trenggalek 
appears to have become a supply base for transmigrants to Irian 
Jaya due to a previous association with Brigadier-General Soet-
ran, once bupati (district head) of Trenggalek then later governor 
of Irian Jaya. Topik describes a marriage ceremony: 
The men and women have reached the canoply after many ups and 
downs and not a few hair-raising experiences. They were first forcibly 
rounded up by the authorities and put into barracks, then transported 
to Trenggalek and put into special training centres for vagrants and 
given several weeks training in basic skills, plus religious and social 
education to prevent them from doing things that could be trouble-
some to the government. 
The social services then coupled the people off, which explains 
why this "happy" occasion is marked by an atmosphere of tension. 
Then comes a remark which shows how transmigration and the 
killings by death-squads are seen as alternative "solutions". 
Long before the "dor-doran" (shooting) season began, Admiral 
Sudomo, then commander of Kopkamtib, suggested that former 
bromocorah (village bandits) should be transmigrated but there was 
no follow-up. Many felt that the risks were too great, that such a step 
would only result in yet more problems. 
This would seem to explain why the rate of killings has been so 
phenomenally high in East Java. 
Villagers in Central Java also forced to marry 
Another Topik report (29th November, 1983) draws attention to 
coercion on villagers in Jatiurip village to remarry if their present 
spouses refuse to transmigrate. Villagers in this area have been 
under strong pressure from the authorities to leave their homes 
and transmigrate. Where a husband or wife refuses to comply, the 
other spouse is "seized", ordered to "marry" someone else so as to 
be able to be transported . These "marriages" consist simply of a 
letter issued by the village-chief with the approval of the sub-dis-
trict chief (camat). So far, 47 families have been moved away; 150 
families remain. Pressure on them to move comes from the com-
bined forces of the lcoal forestry office, the village head, the sub-
district head and the transmigration officer. The latter seems bent 
on achieving his fixed target of transported families, thus becom-
ing eligible for a commission. As for the other officials, they want 
to drive the villagers away so as to gain control of the land for 
other uses. 
Jakarta Vagrants removed 
The Jakarta Municipality has come up with its own "solution" to 
widespread vagrancy in the capital. It has designated Pulau 
Tidung Kecil, in the Bay of Jakarta, as a centre to which vagrants 
rounded up should be sent. These "incorrigible vagrants" as they 
are called, "are supposed to receive training in skills. Afterwards 
. . . they will be given the option of going back to their respective 
villages or being resettled outside Java", write Jakarta Post (27th 
January, 1984). The paper, commenting editorially, then writes: 
... coming right on the heels of reports of the existence of an alleged 
draft law seeking to empower the Government to confine individuals 
to certain restricted areas for vaguely delineated ideological offences, 
the Vice-Governor's announcement cannot help bring with it some un-
pleasant connotations. 
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West Papua 
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Sinar Harapan "severely warned" for reporting 
West Papuan arrest 
The Department of Information has issued "a severe 
warning" to Sinar Harapan for reporting on 6 December 
that Arnold Ap, curator of the Museum of Anthropology in 
Jayapura , had been arrested and that his family did not 
know his whereabouts . Still worse , says the Department's 
warning which was reproduced in full in Sinar Harapan on 
13 March, the paper reported on 13 December that it was in 
breach of the Procedural Code for a family not to know the 
detainee's whereabouts whereas in fact the detainee was 
being treated in conformity with the laws in force. 
According to the Department's warning, as a result of 
the~e reports , individuals in Irian Jaya took irresponsible 
action of such a nature as to put in jeopardy Indonesia's 
close relations with a "certain friendiy foreign country". 
The Department's statement continued: 
Although the editors of Sinar Harapan have apologised, the 
severe warning has nevertheless been delivered because the 
developments were out of all proportion. 
T~e paper was warned not to "dramatise" things or use 
wordmg that could create the wrong impression in the 
community. 
PNG joum~l~st, Neville Togarewa, inside West Papua, interviewing OPM 
defence m1mster Lawrence Doga (left) and Senate chairman Fisor 
Yarisetouw. (PNG Times, 15th rytarch 1984.) ' 
West Papua refugees arrived in Vanimo. (PNG Times, 1 March 1984). 
The Department's statement appears to confirm 
assessments that the arrest of Ap and many others late last 
year provided an impetus to OPM operations in Jayapura in 
February. It also reinforces the impression that the 
Indonesian authorities are facing a serious challenge to 
their rule in West Papua. 
Four West Papuans seek political asylum in 
Holland 
On 29th February, four West Papuans entered the Dutch 
Embassy in Jakarta and requested political asylum. The 
four were eventually allowed to leave Indonesia and fly to 
Holland, though it is unlikely that the Dutch government 
will offer political asylum, 11ut will probably look for 
another status for allowing them to stay. 
Johannes Rumbia, Jopie Rumayom , Otti Simapiaref 
and Loth Sarakan sent a protest on 6th December to the 
Indonesian Parliament concerning the wave of arrests in 
West Papua, when Arnold Ap was imprisoned in Abepura. 
They apparently became frightened of the likelihood of 
being arrested themselves after the uprising in West Papua, 
and the possible consequences of that for them in Java. The 
Indonesian government took the line that the men were not 
being sought and claimed one was a criminal, and therefore 
they had no grounds to ask for political asylum, but it seems 
to have chosen to avoid a protracted dispute over the issue 
and the possibility of adverse publicity. 
The four West Papuans leaving the Dutch embassy in Jakarta on 13th 
March. (Sinar Harapan). They told De Telegraaf (24th March) that an 
army death-squ~d. had called at their hostel to abduct them, but they were 
not at home. This 1s why they decided to seek Dutch protection. 
"A bit authoritarian" 
"In the late 1960s, when the author 
asked a British civil servant in Jakarta 
why the British Council was spending 
so much money on a new large estab-
lishment there, he replied: 'We are a 
bit fed up with the Commonwealth 
countries. We are looking for other 
countries, a bit authoritarian, to 
share their development with them."' 
From Brian May, Russia, America, 
the Bomb and the Fall of Western 
Europe, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 
London 1984, page 124. 
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Interview 
Seth Ru:mkore:m on the resistance in 
West Papua 
Seth Rumkorem has for many years been a leader of the OPM* in West Papua, fighting a guerrilla war against Indonesian forces from the 
jungle. He left West Papua in 1982, after a decision by the OPM that he should go abroad to publicise the situation there, but was apprehended 
by PNG authorities as he and nine companions tried to reach, Vanuatu by boat. He was acquitted of the charge of illegal entry, and allowed to 
stay in Rabaul. In December 1982, however, he had to leave PNG, as Prime Minister Somare was about to make an official visit to Jakarta and 
was anxious to avoid any criticism by Suharto over tolerance of the 0 PM. The United Nations High Commission for Refugees asked the Greek 
government to give him temporary asylum, and he has been allowed to stay in Athens indefinitely with two other 0 PM members. He has tried to 
find another country more suited to advancing the OPM cause which would offer him asylum, so far without success, and is working to 
establish links with similar organisations. The interview was conducted with the help of Luis Nussy, one of the OPM members with Seth. 
February 1984 
Why did you leave the jungle and your country? 
On a national level, our forces matched Indonesian forces in 
West Papua. But at the same time, we could see that 
internationally our position was still far too weak. So the National 
Committee decided that I should leave to head the West Papua 
mission abroad. 
Which countries would you like to visit? 
Among others, Portugal, because it maintains good relations 
with progressive countries in Africa. Portugal is still pressing for 
self-determination in East Timor, and it is sympathetic to Fretilin . 
Is the OPM seeking support from other liberation movements? 
Firstly, we have good relations with Fretilin, and they once 
offered us help. Then there is SW APO, which we can see has · 
attracted many international supporters. We would like to lobby 
for international support with the help of SW APO, and that of the 
PLO and Polisario as well. 
How do you intend to attract publicity for the situation in your 
country, considering that you may have to remain in Greece? 
It seems that if the UNHCR officials cannot help us, we will 
have to stay here in Athens, in which case it will be difficult to 
carry out the task given to us by the national committee, 
particularly if we don't have support from PASOK, the party in 
power in Greece. 
Do you keep contact with other Papuan groups abroad, like those 
of Jacob Prai and Nicholas Jouwe, and will you work together with 
any of them? 
Markas Victoria (OPM HQ in W. Papua) is represented 
abroad by Bernard Tenggahma, who is in Dakar (Senegal), then 
there are ministers in Holland like Eliezer Bonay, Markus 
Kaisieppo, Tang Seng Thay, and in Sweden, Amos Indey and 
Darius Maury. We don't have relations with Prai and Jouwe. 
Jouwe engages in a lot of fantasy, and his attitude is very 
unstable-sometimes to the West, sometimes to the East, 
sometimes northwards, then southwards. Today he concocts a 
plan, tomorrow he abandons it and makes others. Recently he put 
forward the idea of West Papua obtaining autonomy within the 
Indonesian Republic. This is totally unacceptable to us. He hasn't 
learned from history that it is impossible to trust Indonesia. He 
would like to create a sort ofWest Bank of the Jordan in West 
Papua. How is this possible if millions of transmigrants are 
brought there from Java, and how then can one million P,apuans 
go on demanding self-determination? When there are 12 million 
transmigrants in W. Papua, Indonesia will be able to hold a 
referendum which it will undoubtedly win. So Jouwe's plan is pure 
fantasy. As for Prai, I think he is a good person. Before he left 
Markas Victoria, he sought my help in a number of things, and 
was very interested then in what I was trying to do. His shortfall is 
that he has a weak character and is easily influenced by others, 
*The OPM (Organisasi Papua Merdeka) is also known as the FPM (Free 
Papua Movement) . 
which is why he is now under the influence of Jouwe and Henk 
Yoku. 
How extensive is the OPM's influence and control of West Papua? 
Let's look at it from the point of view of the territory liberated 
by the OPM, and territory under our influence. To start with , the 
district of Jayapura, which we call Mamta province, is 95% under 
our influence or actually liberated. In the area around Jayapura 
itself, 60% is under our influence. In Biak and Japen-Waropen, 
the situation is much the same as in Jayapura, and in the di~trict of 
Manokwari, only the towns of Ransiki and Manokwari are 
controlled by Indonesian forces; the rest of the territory is under 
our influence. In Sorong district, the enemy controls the town of 
Sorong and the islands of Gag and Waigeo , but the rest of it is 
under our influence. In Enarotali, only Freeport is controlled by 
Indonesian forces: virtually 100% of this territory is under our 
influence, and this is also the situation in Wamena and Merauke. 
In the district of Fak-Fak, only Fak-Fak and Kaimana are under 
Indonesian control. 
The guerrilla base in the north was moved from the border area 
to the interior in 1980. It is easier to keep contact with the whole of 
W. Papua from this position . The Indonesians don't yet know 
about the location of our new base. They still think it is near the 
border: indeed, Prai's ~roup is still carrying out operations near 
the border, and also to the south inside West Papuan territory. 
We feel the benefit of this because it draws the Indonesian forces 
away to the border area, making it easier for us to start putting 
into practice our new strategy of switching from defensive-
offensive to offensive-defensive tactics. 
Seth Rumkorem (right) and Luis Nussy in Athens. 
What are the OPM's policies in social and economic matters? 
That's a good question, because West Papua is the richest 
country in the Pacific area for minerals. There are 29 different 
minerals in West Papua, from copper to uranium, as well as 
petroleum and natural gas. In Sorong alone, the production of 
petroleum is now almost 500,000 barrels a day. In those areas 
which we have liberated, we implement a program called program 
kemajuan desa-the village advancement programme. It is 
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through this that we are laying down the foundation for our 
policies after we are fully independent. 
The program kemajuan desa involves political education and 
literacy work, general education, health and welfare, agriculture 
and co-operatives, and helping the community by giving them the 
knowledge and guidance to set up their own enterprises. We have 
taken heed of the way that third world countries manage their 
economies. In some cases, they are still controlled by foreign 
interests, and the people in these countries don't participate 
actively in their own economic development. We are making the 
necessary preparations for the Papuan people to become involved 
later on in our own economic efforts. We don 't pursue a policy of 
100% free enterprise or 100% socialism, as some third world 
countries do; instead we've chosen a mixed system. Take, for 
example, timber logging. There is plenty of timber to be had. The 
government need only work to reach agreements with those 
countries interested in exploiting West Papuan timber , then once 
agreement has been reached, local communities can work jointly 
with foreign companies. 
Politically, we are preparing people to feel responsible for the 
struggle to achieve an independent West Papua. But at the same 
time, we are trying to give them a sense of responsibility for 
collectively controlling the government so as to ensure that it is 
democratic . That is emphasised in point four of the general 
program of the West Papuan revolution : that we oppose all forms 
of totalitarianism. 
Life in West Papua is still very traditional. How do people react to 
your new economic and social policies? 
In my own experience-and I am directly involved in this 
program kemajuan desa-many people ask questions about the 
policies we will pursue after the world recognises our 
independence. We try to explain our plans slowly and carefully, 
and we've found that wherever we go and discuss political issues 
with the people, they do generally agree with our future polici~s. 
An important element in this is that we would allow traditional 
ways of life to continue alongside the new ideas, now during the 
struggle, and later when we achieve our objective. We do try to 
discourage old ideas like the cargo cults which don 't fit in with our 
revolution. We explain to the people what the West Papuan 
republic will be like, the aims of the revolution, and then explain 
to them what the cargo cult really is, and what its aims are. In this 
way, people can make a fair comparison between the two. 
How has it been possible for the OPM to remain active and strong, 
and how do the Papuan people support it? 
The West Papuan people feel a sense of obligation towards 
participating in our struggle. They feel directly involved, and give 
support quite voluntarily, without us asking. That's why young 
people continually join our ranks. I sometimes feel very moved at 
the spontaneous assistance given to us . Any movement by 
Indonesian troops is reported to us, without our asking, and 
Papuan youths who are studying in Java do everything they can to 
help. In this way we can always follow events in Indonesia and in 
West Papua, which is why the OPM's position is so much stronger 
today than it was two decades ago. We are convinced that as our 
strength improves to match that of the Indonesians in West 
Papua, it will not be possible for Indonesia to defeat the West 
Papuan people's struggle . 
How have traditional land rights been affected since the 
Indonesians began their own social and economic policies? 
Ten years ago, it was still possible to negotiate with the 
Indonesians over the compensation paid by them for land taken 
for transmigration and other projects. Now there is no discussion 
or bargaining: people are deprived of their traditional land rights, 
and ordered off their land by the government which then pays 
whatever compensation it considers adequate. The land may be 
given to Javanese transmigrants, or to ministers and generals loyal 
to Suharto. For example, Holtekang near Jayapura, and the 
region up to the border, all this land is now the property of 
Madame Suharto. We also now know from a captured document, 
that the entire region of Merauke is included in the areas to be 
used for transmigration planned for Pelita IV and Pelita V (see 
page 4). The government is not at all concerned about whether the 
local population agrees with these plans or not. West Papuan 
people give support to the OPM as the only possible response to 
this forced expropriation of their land rights. I must use this term 
because the compensation paid is not adequate. Where 
transmigration is being pushed rapidly ahead, the only chance for 
Papuans is to turn to us, since they hope that if the OPM is 
victorious, their land may be restored to them . 
The whole northern coastal region in the district of Jayapura is 
included in the Pelita IV transmigration programme, and all the 
good land in the district of Wamena has been included in this 
programme . Looking at this document dealing with 
transmigration plans for Peli ta IV and Peli ta V, it is clear that 
Papuans will become foreigners in their own land , poor people in 
an abundantly rich country. 
ls it true that transmigration has become a policy with important 
political and security objectives? 
Transmigration to West Papua is part of the wawasan 
nusantara doctrine and it is quite clear that its aim is to achieve 
ketahanan Indonesia* politically, economically and militarily. 
Politically, Indonesia would collapse without West Papua, since if 
West Papua were to leave the Republic, other parts of the country 
would try to do the same. That's why everything is done to keep 
West Papua within the Republic. Economically, West Papua is an 
important source of wealth for Indonesia, as well as a place where 
many people find lucrative jobs. On the military side, the island of 
Papua has been a front line of defence for Australia ever since the 
Second World War. Indonesia itself is a kind of gateway between 
two oceans and the link between two continents, and makes great 
use of the international political situation to enhance its position 
as a Pacific power. Without West Papua, Indonesia's strategic 
position in the Pacific would be much weaker. We can see its 
preoccupation with security in the construction of the Trans-Irian 
highway and the restoration of airfields in Biak and Morotai. 
Indonesia is using transmigration in Pelita IV to strengthen its 
position from all points of view in West Papua and the eastern part 
of the republic. 
How many freedom fighters are there fighting for the OPM, and 
how does the OPM co-ordinate their operations? 
In Markas Victoria, there are 500 fighters, members of the 
Tentara Pembebasan Nasional. Besides that, there are members 
in every town in a state of "stand-by", ready to take part at the 
right time in any major offensive. Prai's group operate from PNG, 
and consist of 800 people in the north and the same number in the 
south. Around Freeport and Enarotali, there are about 2,000 
OPM fighters. All we lack are the weapons to equip our forces, 
which total altogether 30,000 to 50,000 people. As an indication of 
how much Papuan people are willing to struggle to drive the 
Indonesians from the country, I can say that if we had the arms 
we would in a single day be able to recruit 20,000 more people'. 
"I can say that if we had the arms, we 
would, in a single day, be able to recruit 
20,000 more people. This is quite obvious, 
yet Indonesia always claims nothing is 
going on in West Papua." 
T~is is qu~te obvious, yet Indonesia always claims that nothing is 
gomg on m West Papua, that there is no liberation movement 
there. Indonesian forces know that the natural environment of 
our country is well suited to fighting a guerrilla war, which is why 
they have follo"'.ed our defensive-offensive strategy and avoided 
armed contact with the OPM. This has meant that there have been 
very few opportunities for us to capture weapons from the 
*Wawasan nusantara, island teritory; ketahanan Indonesia Indonesian 
defence capability. ' 
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Indonesian Army, while their troops stick to defending the towns . 
W~ have now switched to using an offensive-defensive strategy, 
which we think will enable us to obtain more arms supplies. 
As you ·know, Indonesia has the largest armed forces in S.E. Asia. 
How can the OPM mount operations against these forces and be 
successful? 
According to the Pacific Defence Report, December 1982-
January 1983, ABRI has a total strengh of around 450,000 men, 
but there is a huge gap between manpower and equipment. There 
are only 45 combat aircraft from the UK and the USA (Hawks, 
Broncos and other jet fighters) and from Australia (Sabres and 
Canberras). The Navy has three corvettes from Holland equipped 
with French Exocet missiles, and there are high speed vessels 
from S. Korea, plus 12 De Havilland patrol aircraft from 
Australia. 
We hold one great advantage over the Indonesians in the area 
of transport and communications. To transport even a platoon of 
men is very difficult for them. The jungles, rivers, mountains and 
marshland make West Papuan terrain very difficult to travel 
through. We are thoroughly accustomed to this, but Indonesian 
soldiers who have been trained in the easier environment of Java , 
are quite unused to what they find in our country. If they wish to 
travel by foot, ·they must force villagers to act as guides and 
porters, though often these are paid workers for the Indonesians 
anyway. We shoot these people, leaving the Indonesian soldiers 
to wander until they starve, when we can attack them and take 
their weapons . This avoids heavy armed combat with Indonesian 
forces. 
There is a second advantage, one we have learned from 
observing other liberation struggles in Africa and Asia . I myself 
Death-squads 
was formerly in the TNI, and I studied Indonesia 's own anti-
guerrilla tactics, known as Perang Wilaya (territorial warfare) as 
well as those used in Malaya and Indochina . Before Indonesia is 
able to apply these tactics, we strive to cut relations between the 
Indonesian government and the mass of people . There is one unit 
of our National Liberation Army called the "Satuan Tugas 
Rangkap" which has the task of giving out information to the 
people so that they are not deceived by Indonesian propaganda. 
Indonesia cannot use its "fence of legs" tactic in West Papua, 
because the OPM can use the very thick jungle and difficult 
terrain to oppose the Indonesians with a "fence of trees" . We have 
also begun to try to attract the attention of western states through 
the international media in order that they might reconsider their 
present policy of invariably giving help to Indonesia. It is 
important to look to the future , and to remember that a time will 
come when our generation no longer exists. The younger 
generation now at school are showing themselves to be a lot more 
radical , and the time will come when they take over the movement 
from us . New possibilities, not now visible, will become apparent 
in the future . 
Our political efforts are combined with small-scale armed 
encounters which are regulated and controlled in such a way as to 
grow gradually into a powerful offensive. I mean that with these 
small actions, people build up their courage and conviction, their 
political consciousness grows, and they are all the more ready and 
willing to support us. As this process intensifies, so people will 
participate without being asked , in a nationwide guerrilla war. 
That is our final objective, a truly national liberation war. 
The second part of the interview with Seth Rumkorem will appear 
in TAPOL Bulletin No. 63. 
8,500 victinis in E. Java alone, reports 
Dutch journalist 
An Indonesian journalist who monitored the army death-squad 
killing of alleged criminals by collecting figures weekly from 
district police offices throughout East Java calculates that up to 
the end of 1983, about 8,500 people were murdered in that 
province alone. This figure only includes deaths recorded by the 
police; the journalist would not speculate on how many 
unrecorded deaths there may have been. 
These findings were reported by Krijnie van de Bent in Vrij 
Nederland (1 i February 1984). He later asked a lawyer in East 
Java who has had many dealings with people on the run from the 
death-squads whether he thought this figure was plausible. The 
lawyer thought it was. At this lawyer's office, van de Bent met a 
fugitive from a village in East Java who escaped when six of his 
friends were caught and then disappeared. This was from a village 
of about a hundred people. · 
In Central Java, van de Bent was told that people near 
Wonosari, where rivers flow underground through caves, had 
seen army trucks arrive twice weekly and dump bodies in the 
caves. People in the vicinity thought that these bodies were being 
brought there from East as well as from Central Java. 
More bodies discovered in Jakarta 
With the media again under strict orders not to 1T1ention 
"mystery" killings after a brief spate of news items about the issue 
at the time Dutch Foreign Minister Hans van der Broek was in 
Jakarta last January (see TAPOL Bulletin No. 61, January 1984), 
newspapers now confine themselves to occasionally reporting the 
discovery of corpsesThe kind of detail provided suggests that they 
are in fact talking about the same thing. On 2 Feb~uary, Sinar 
Harapan reported the discovery of two bodies, both with gunshot 
wounds. On 20 February, Sinar Harapan and Merdeka both 
reported the discovery of five corpses , all with gunshot wounds . 
One man was found hanging from a tree, but had apparently been 
shot dead before he was strung up. 
Villagers in Singosari, Boyolali, Central Java, found ten corpses 
in nearby ricefields and ditches recently , reports Tempo (28th 
January, 1984) . The men had died not from bullet wounds but 
from starvation; their bodies were nothing more than skin and 
bones. 
The villagers say t~at many so-called petty criminals, known as 
gali-gali fled to the mountains in Boyolali soon after the death-
squad killings began in Cental Java. They have had great difficulty 
surviving and frequently turn up in villages to beg for food. The 
villagers have no idea how many there were but thought there 
must be very many. The village head received so many complaints 
that he ordered the people to set up a village security system; 
villagers also decided to set up barricades every evening on all the 
roads leading into the village . When these measures failed to 
protect fruit and crops outside the boundary, the people decided 
to join forces with the army and police to carry out sweeps in the 
mountains to round up the fugitives. The operation led to the 
capture of only three severely malnourished men hardly capable 
any longer of walking, who were then detained in a local police 
office. The authorities have now decided that these operations are 
not worth the effort. "Just let them die of hunger", said one police 
officer. 
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Press censorship 
Two journals banned 
Topik 
The weekly magazine Topik has been banned because of an edito-
rial in its issue of 21 February 1984 which "contains communist 
tendencies" and "promotes the idea of the class struggle". 
The offending issue focused its cover story on the question of 
poverty in Indonesia . The report was entitled "Looking for a 
hundred kinds of poor people" echoing the title of an article pub-
lished a few . months ago by the glossy magazine Expo which was 
also banned for publishing a report on "Indonesia's one hundred 
millionaires" . 
The extract from Topik's editorial to which particular excep-
tion was taken reads as follows: 
It is out of the question for the condition of the poor to change without 
their having power. And power cannot be created unless it is seized. 
The seat of power will only come about if the oppressed exert them-
selves to seize it. This is a struggle that will take a very long time . 
The editorial also warned that romantic attitudes towards the 
poor are useless, nor is it any good displaying a kind of "platonic 
affection" for the poor. It is worthless to place trust in the "trickle-
down mechanism" . 
In another item in the same issue, a regular feature about 
"Eben", the popular character who expounds views and com-
ments about current affairs, the opinion is expressed that "corrup-
tion in Indonesia is more dangerous than communism" . 
"Cynicism and insinuations" 
Although Soekarno, the Director-General for Press and Graphics 
Guidance at the Department of Information "could not re-
The "trickle-down" mechanism. (Topik, 14th February 1984.) 
member" whether the ban on Topik had been preceded by a warn-
ing, he told the press that an earlier issue of the publication also 
caused offence because of an "Eben" piece which took the form of 
an imaginary interview with "Pak Harto" (the president, Su~arto) 
and contained many criticisms of the state apparat_us, the _sm~le­
ideology doctrine and the "P4" compulsory mdoctnnatt~n 
courses. That piece was full of "cynicjsm and insinuations, and did 
not reflect a free and responsible press", he said (Tempo, 3rd 
March, 1984). 
Tempo also reports that even before the ban was imposed, the 
Editor-in-Chief, Soepeno, and the proprietor B.M. Diah sensed 
that a 'breach' had been committed by allowing these "dangerous 
thoughts" to be expressed. "We reported the matter to the au-
thorities even before they took action", said Soepeno. 
No sympathy from Journalists Association 
The chairman of the Indonesian Journalists' Association, PWI, 
H. Zulharman who warned recently of the need to "prevent PKI 
(Communist Party) remnants from infiltrating its ranks" (see 
TAPOL Bulletin, No.61, November 1983, page 10) ~aid that the 
PWI would not lift a finger to defend Topik and call for the ban to 
be lifted . He foresaw that further problems would arise when the 
question of the company's business licence (SIUPP) comes up for 
consideration. (According to revisions made to the censorship law 
last year, censorship violations can now lead to the withdrawal of 
the licence of the publishing house as a whole, not merely to the 
particular title being banned. B.M. Diah who owns Topik is the 
owner of one of Indonesia's largest and oldest publishing houses 
whose publications include two leading dailies, Merdeka and the 
Indonesian Observer.) 
Zulharman went on to say that the journalist who wrote the of-
fending editorial will have to be identifiecl. If he/she is a member 
of the PWI, expulsion is almost certain to follow. 
Expo 
A month before Topik lost its licence, the glossy fortnightly jour-
nal, Expo was forced to close down following publication of a 
series of articles entitled "A Hundred Millionaires". The Infor-
mation Ministry claimed that the articles were "full of personal 
abuse", "sensationalist" and "full of insinuations" and were there-
fore in violation of "a free and responsible press". (Tempo, 21 
January, 1984) The articles had certainly won the journal a great 
deal of popularity as circulation had gone up from 10,000 to 
40,000 within weeks. 
The Information Ministry's ban was preceded by a series of 
warnings related to articles published by Expo about customs offi-
cials (who have been under fire recently following the exposure of 
widespread corruption). The editors had been ordered to halt 
these reports because they were "one-sided", and on that occa-
sion, they complied. 
Sondang P. Napitupulu, Expo editor and writer of the offend-
ing articles, declares that he violated no regulations and had sim-
ply drawn together a host of data from many reliable sources. Son-
dang is described by Tempo as a "controversial" figure who goes 
in for a somewhat unconventional style of news gathering. He has 
often been threatened by people who resent things he has written. 
As for the Information Ministry, they have made it.clear that the 
lifting of the ban will be conditional upon Sondang being removed 
from the editorial staff of Expo. 
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The media 
Propaganda by satellite 
The. lo~s of the $75 million Indonesian satellite, Palapa B2, at the 
begmnmg of .February brought Indonesia's interest in space 
technology bnefly to the world's attention . Palapa B2 was the 
fourth satellite to be launched by the Indonesian Government, 
and its loss will not impair one of the main functions of the other 
three, namely to provide television viewing to a remarkably large 
number of people over a substantial area of the archipelago . 
Television has become a powerful instrument of government 
propaganda, with over 95 million viewers, 60% of the population. 
While people voice understandable concern over the heavy 
censorship of the press, the total readership of all papers in 
Indonesia is nowhere near the total number who watch television. 
TVRI is the only television company in Indonesia, and not 
surprisingly it is completely state owned and controlled. 
Newspapers are read mostly in urban areas, yet Indonesia is a 
predominantly rural country, and TVRI has gradually changed its 
content to suit rural audiences. Entertainment has been cut back 
to 27% of programme content in favour of education and culture, 
and in 1981, TV advertisements were banned because the 
Government felt they emphasised the wealth gap between rural 
and urban areas. There have been so many complaints about the 
rural orientation ofTVRI that a second channel, for Jakarta, has 
been proposed, but for the Government it is important to extend 
state propaganda to different parts of the country through 
television. 
The main radio station in Indonesia is RRI, and that too is state 
owned, under the control of the Department of Information. Like 
TVRI, it has a strongly rural outlook, unlike the urban private 
stations. Even these non-government stations are strictly 
regulated over news broadcasts; they may only put out 15-minute 
news bulletins compiled by RRI, six times a day . It is quite clear 
that broadcasting gives the Indonesian regime a degree of 
influence over the population that it could not hope to exert 
otherwise. If the Security forces take the trouble to close down 
dissenting newspapers, they nevertheless have a total monopoly 
on news and information reaching the great majority of 
Indonesian people. The most popular daily paper, the tabloid-
style Pos Kota, has a readership of less than two million and a 
circulation of only 250,000 and the two main non-government 
quality papers, Kompas and Sinar Harapan, have a joint 
circulation of 635 ,000 and an estimated readership of around two-
and-a-half million between them. It begins to look a very limited 
circulation compared to the 95 million television viewers. 
Tight control of the press is still as prevalent as ever. In 
February, the magazine Topik was closed for showing supposed 
"communist tendencies". The "telephone tradition" is-.still the 
favoured method of censorship, whereby security forces may give 
sudden instructions to ban an area of coverage to editors over the 
phone. 
More often than not the constraints placed on the press are non-
negotiable . To discuss broad issues concerning press coverage, the 
editors have regular consultations with Information Ministry officials, 
who are in close touch with key military organisations such as 
KOPKAMTIB, the intelligence co-ordination body BAKIN and the 
Jakarta garrison. An extraordinary meeting, possibly attended by 
military officials concerned, may be called by the Information Ministry 
to impose a blackout on a specific news item. (Far Eastern Economic 
Review, 1st March, 1984.) 
It is made quite clear to newspapers that they print only with 
government approval, although the actual limits of censorship are 
undefined, so that Indonesian papers tend to censor themselves 
more severely than the government requires, to avoid incurring 
official displeasure. The penalties for straying outside 
"acceptable" reporting are high: recent legislation allows the 
Government not only to close down a paper indefinitely, but also 
the parent company. 
Editors have no choice but to comply with restrictions, and to 
report potentially problematic news in language vague enough to 
appear innocuous. One editor described a typical response to 
government objections over a report: 
We reasoned at the time that the government will go on being what it is 
whether or not we give up: so there was no use our stopping 
publication in defiance ... we chose to accommodate, taking all the 
consequences of our accommodation. (FEER, 1st March , 1984) 
Chinese-language press control 
The only Chinese-language newspaper now permitted to appear is 
Indonesia Ribao, a tabloid which is published under the auspices 
of BAKIN. The Chinese-language content is being steadily 
reduced and will eventually be eliminated altogether . Apart from 
this publication, "Chinese-language publications can neither be 
imported nor produced domestically. Chinese characters are 
routinely blocked out of foreign news photos and advertising". 
(US State Department Country Reports on Human Rights 
Practices for 1983, Washington, February 1984.) 
Women's access to medical facilities to be 
restricted 
From now on, women may not exceed 30 per cent of students 
entering medical faculties throughout Indonesia, according to a 
decision of the university authorities. The decision was 
announced by Dr Mahar Mardjono, chairman of the Indonesian 
Doctors Association (IOI) who said that the health authorities 
consider that too ll'lany women have entered the medical 
profession in the past few years. They allege that some provincial 
health services are finding it difficult to staff medical centres 
because "only women doctors" are available . In West Sumatra , 
for instance, about 60 per cent of the doctors are women . 
The IOI chairman also told the press that women would no 
longer be acceptable for appointment as assistant lecturers. 
The chairwoman of the Indonesian Women's Congress, Mrs 
Murpratomo, greeted this decision by saying that she does not 
consider this an act of discrimination against women. It was taken, 
she claimed, with the national interests in mind, so as to ensure 
that there are enough doctors to meet society's needs. In her 
opinion, women's rights are already well protected in Indonesia. 
Indonesian women have no use for western · movements like 
"women's lib" which encourage women "to think only of 
themselves" . 
Source: Sinar Harapan, 12th and 13th March, 1983. 
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Human rights violations 
New societies law effectively ends the right to organise 
A draft law on social organisations is in preparation which will 
completely destroy all remaining rights to organise as indepen-
dent associations in Indonesia. The draft was leaked to the public 
before being submitted to Parliament and has already aroused 
criticism. Four of the five politically-aligned student organisations 
known as the Cipayung Group have issued a statement which con-
demns this as an example of power being used to legitimise mea-
sures that conflict with democratic principles and civil rights . 
(Sinar Harapan, February, 1984). The nationalist GMNI refused 
to sign the statement . 
The draft affects not only the mass organisations of youth , stu-
dents and women which, according to well-established tradition in 
Indonesia, generally align with various political parties and which 
will no longer be permitted to do so. It also affects societies in the 
broadest meaning, whatever the limits of their concerns. These 
societies which have come into existence in large numoers in the 
past few years are often referred to as 'NGOs' (non-government 
organisations). 
According to the leaked draft, all organisations will be re-
quired 
• to adopt the Pancasila as their sole ideology, 
• to work to safeguard the success of national development and 
implementation of the "State Guidelines" , 
• to register with the authorities and maintain a list of members , 
• not to confine membership to people of one ethnic origin. 
Societies may only be established with the approval of the 
Minister of the Interior, the provincial governor or district head 
according to whether they are national , provincial or local in 
scope and membership . They will be proscribed from spreading 
communist or Marxist-Leninist teachings or other teachings that 
conflict with Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution . 
They will not be allowed to engage in political activities and 
may only accept financial support from abroad with the approval 
of the government. 
Societies pursuing similar social interests will be required to 
come together under a single umbrella to be regulated by the com-
petent official. In the case of youth and women's organisations, 
this unifying process will be regulated by the President . They will 
all be subject to government supervision and will receive warnings 
or be ordered to disband if they violate existing laws. This supervi-
sion will be regulated by the Minister of the Interior or other com-
petent minister, depending upon the social interest of the organi-
sation . 
All organisations in existence at the time this law comes into 
force will be required to bring themselves into line within a year. 
Will Youth Organisations Oppose? 
Ever since the adoption of the decision on a "single ideology" 
( azas tunggal) atthe 1983 sessiori of the 'People's' Assembly, a law 
applying this to mass organisations has been expected. The Mus-
lim students organisation, HMI, refused at its conference in 1983 
to adopt the "azas tunggal", saying at the time that it would con-
sider the matter once the law on mass organisations had been 
enacted . HMI was one of the four Cipayung Group organisations 
to criticise the draft law recently. It remains to be seen whether 
they will decide not to comply with the swingeing provisions of the 
draft law. 
A cautionary tale 
When telling your experi-
ences can land you in jail 
When Agus Salim arrived to take up his 
post as a teacher at the Teachers' Training 
College in Slawi, Central Java in February 
1983, he was asked to introduce himself to a 
gathering of the student body. Nothing un-
usual about that . Then someone asked him 
to relate his past experiences whereupon he 
described an event that took place when he 
was a student at the Institute of Education 
(IKIP) in Jakarta . In 1978, he said, the stu-
dents had been worried about the People's 
Assembly (MPR) which was to elect 
Suharto to his third term of office. He 
explained how the students had raised criti-
cisms about the president and expressed the 
view that the MPR was a charade . 
school director heard all this , he decided 
this was a matter for the district Office of 
Education who promptly took the case to 
the Central Java Kopkamtib officer who 
knew a suspect when he saw one. On 13th 
May , in the middle of the night, this danger-
ous character was picked up and placed in 
detention . 
the time to serve the Pancasila well." 
In court, Agus Salim confessed to having 
spoken about the 1978 affair and admitted 
that he was wrong not to have drawn the 
right conclusions. "I apologise and ask for-
giveness. Some students misinterpreted 
what I said·" 
Whether found guilty or not, he has al-
ready paid for his unfortunate choice of 
topic with nearly ten months in detention. 
(Based on a report in Tempo, 10th March, 
1984.) 
Soon afterwards, two students reported 
that he had spoken disparagingly about the 
Pancasila as "nothing more than a theory" , 
a remark which certainly disqualified him as 
a teacher. They took their complaint to the 
teachers in control of the inter-school stu-
dent organisation ( Organisasi Siswa Intra 
Sekolah) who could not let the matter rest 
there. Determined to find out more about 
this suspect, they proceeded to compile a 
dossier on him and discovered that he al-
lowed students to smoke in class, had ad-
mitted to having had 20 girlfriends, and lots 
of other disreputable things. When the 
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Eight months later , Agus Salim found 
himself in court, charged with "insulting the 
President" in violation of Article 134 of the 
Criminal Code . 
"I fail to understand how such an inci-
dent could have led to a trial", the accused is 
reported to have said, shortly before the 
trial started. "In fact, I told the students at 
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[Also see TAPOL Bulletin No. 56, March 
1983, for a report about teachers in schools 
being given instructions to spy on the politi-
cal inclinations of their students and pupils.] 
' Human rights violations 
Dutch trade unionist 
visit 
"We should make it absolutely clear that in many essential 
respects, the Indonesian trade union movement lacks basic rights 
to defend the interests of the workers", Wim Kok, chairman of 
the Dutch trade union federation, the FNV told a press 
conference in Amsterdam on his return from a visit to Indonesia 
and other countries of South East Asia. He had been on a mission 
of the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions which 
also included Moss Evans, General Secretary of one of Britain's 
major trade unions the Transport and General Workers Union . 
Moss Evans has not yet made public his impressions of the visit to 
Jakarta. 
Workers in the public and semi-public sector are prohibited 
from joining unions and are required to join KORPRI which is a 
state organisation, not a trade union, said Wim Kok, who also 
condemned the fact that the right to strike had been effectively 
eliminated even though it still remains on the statute book, 
"Everything must be resolved by means of consultations, to reach 
a consensus. If this fails, the government steps in and insists that 
workers must not strike because of the need for loyalty to the state 
ideology, Pancasila. They are told to behave like 'good citizens'. 
When we asked what happened if foreign companies failed to 
behave like 'good citizens', we got no reply". 
The Dutch trade unionist said the influence of the military is 
felt in all sectors of the community. "Whatever the laws prescribe, 
action is out of the question." The army's grip on society is very 
stifling. They impose their will on the workers through the FBSI, 
the only trade union that is permitted to exist and which he 
described as nothing more than an extension of the regime. 
Trade unions in other countries should do everything to 
support Indonesian workers who have a difficult time trying to 
defend workers' interests and to improve the inhuman conditions 
in which many of them work. '.'Many people whom we met urged 
us not to leave them in the lurch ." 
Source: De Waarheid and Volkskrant, 8th February 1984. 
No more strikes, says Sudomo 
The Minister of Labour, Admiral Sudomo has categorically 
declared that he will reject all requests from trade unions for 
permission to strike, whatever the reasons. Granting 
permission to strike, he said, would only disrupt stability. 
Trade unions "should use all approaches and consultations 
with the employers because strikes are damaging not only to 
companies but also to the workers" . 
He said that even though the law on strikes is going to be 
changed, bans on strikes would only apply to vital enterprises . 
But trade unions should nevertheless avoid going on strike in 
other enterprises and should seek a settlement by consultation . 
(Sinar Harapan, 14 March, 1984.) 
Sudomo's statement can be interpreted as meaning that the 
government feels it cannot legally ban all strikes, only those 
affecting vital enterprises . But the Minister will use his 
executive powers to prevent any strikes from occurring. 
Tennis chanipion stopped front going abroad 
Indonesia's top tennis player, Asian Games gold-medallist 
Yustedjo Tarik was prevented from going abroad recently when 
he turned up at the international airport in Jakarta, on his way to 
Bangkok to participate in a tournament. Immigration officials 
prevented his departure on an instruction which had originated 
from Major-General (retired) Jonosewojo, the president of the 
Indonesian Tennis Federation (Petti). The retired general 
decided that Yustedjo needed to be disciplined for "unruly" 
behaviour during training and on the courts. When asked why he 
had taken this extraordinary step, Jonosewojo simply said that 
"Yustodjo's loyalty to the Republic is questionable". 
Tempo reports (25th February, 1984) that there are four bodies 
1S'l'f 
Melatih = training. Keluar negeri = going abroad. Tempo, 3rd March 
1984. 
Brig-Gen. Jonosewojo at his Pelti office. "I'm the Commander at Pelti, 
aren't I?" 
or officials with powers to prevent people from leaving the 
country: the Defence Ministry, the Armed Forces Commander-
in-Chief, the Supreme Court and the joint intelligence agency, 
BAKIN. It was the latter body which Jonosewojo used to prevent 
Yustedjo's departure. 
The tennis champion has displayed an attitude of defiance, 
refusing to apologise for his alleged misdemeanours. He now 
refuses to play any more for the Federation and has announced 
that he is seeking legal advice on how to sue for damages. 
Many top positions in the spotting world are held by senior 
army officers. Jonosewojo presides over two other sports 
federations , including the Weight-lifting Federation, Major-
General A cub Zainul, formerly commander of Irian Jaya is leader 
of the Football Federation, and General Rudini, Army Chief-of-
Staff was recently elected president of the Karate Federation. 
TAPOL Bulletin No. 62 March 1984 13 
East Timor 
Fighting continues as hundreds flee 
''cliinate of fear'' in the towns 
As the Indonesian offensive continues , there are reports of more 
desertions from the Indonesian army, of people fleeing the 
Indonesian-occupied areas to join forces with the guerrillas and of 
"disappearances" . 
AFP reported from Jakarta on 19 February that ambushes and 
skirmishes had become increasingly fierce six months after the 
offensive was launched in August. Military circles believe that 
operations are "likely to continue at least until the end of April" 
and that "elite (Kopassandha) battalions , backed by helicopters, 
AMX-13 tanks and Bronco OVlO fighter planes, are being led by 
Colonel Rudito, * a field officer who has resolved to fight to the 
end" (South China Morning Post, 20th February, 1984) . 
After pointing out that these military operations are "top 
secret" in Indonesia and reports on them are banned in the local 
press, AFP adds: 
The military operations and intensive activity of the Indonesian Secret 
Services--checks, arrests and assigned housing-have created a 
climate of fear among the population. Fear of arrest has led several 
hundred Fretilin sympathisers to take. to the hills with or without their 
families and join the guerrillas there, church sources said . 
These unexpected reinforcements , added to the some hundred 
"deserters" of the Indonesian Army's Timorese Auxiliary has brought 
the number of Fretilin guerrillas to more than 800, the sources said . 
The same report reveals that an official of the US embassy in 
Jakarta recently made a discreet visit to East Timor to gather 
information following a statement late last year by 105 members 
of the US Congress urging the Reagan Administration to include 
East Timor on its foreign policy agenda. 
On the level of fighting, AFP quoted military sources in 
Jakarta as saying that "the fighting is worse" than expected and 
that "losses were too high" . A Dutch journalist in Jakarta in 
March wrote: 
heavy fighting is still going on, particularly in the mountains ... In the 
past few months, the fighting has greatly intensified. The Indonesian 
troops are ill-prepared to cope with the tactics of the guerrillas and are 
not hardened enough fop the fight. (NRC Handelsblad, 3rd March, 
1984.) 
Amnesty campaigns for more "disappeared" 
On 20th February, Amnesty International launched an Urgent 
Action on behalf of 23 people thought to have disappeared after 
having been arrested some time since August 1983. They include 
Father Domingos Soares, a priest from Ossu, Viqueque who was 
arrested late in January in Ossu. The others are: 
Albino Lourdes Paulo Mesquita 
Domingo Seixas Bonifacio Magno 
foao Bosco de Araujo Abel Ximenes 
Porfirio Cursino Fernando Soares 
Eurico de Jesus Agostinho (nurse employed at 
Maria Nicolau dos Reyes Farma Zelia, Dili) 
Jose de Sousa Antonio Piedade 
David Ximenes Filomeno Paixao 
Belmiro Henrique Jose Henriques 
Helder Jordao de Araujo Octavio Jordao de Araujo 
Evangelino (teacher at primary, Caetano de Sousa Gutteres 
school, Balide, Dili) Francisco Calcona 
Some are thought to have been sent to regional military 
headquarters in Bali or to Atauro. Amnesty has also received 
information that some may be held at a newly constructed prison 
in · Becora on the outskirts of Dili. Amnesty has also received 
reports of several hundred arrests in East Timor between August 
1983 and the end of January 1984. 
The former Bishop of Dili, Mgr da Costa Lopez ~ho attended 
a session of the UN Human Rights Commission in Geneva in 
February said that, according to his information, these 23 people 
had been removed from their places of imprisonment late at night 
and shot dead. (Radio Nederland, 22nd February, 1984.) The 
former Bishop told the Commission that 
only a genuine and completely free act of self-determination will bring 
peace to East Timor and the war will go on and on for as long as natural 
justice and freedom are denied to the East Timorese people. 
The Human Rights Commission was also addressed by a 
representative of Pax Romana who said that East Timor's right to 
self-determination which is non-negotiable "cannot be considered 
to have been forfeited .. . because of the passage of time, the 
weight of the Indonesian presence or material changes in the 
situation". He stressed that the issue should be kept on the UN 
agenda and abstaining countries urged to reconsider their position 
and commit themselves in support of the East Timorese. 
Indonesian Bishops' open letter to East 
Timor Church 
The Indonesian Bishops Conference (MA WI) sent an open letter 
to the Catholic Church in East Timor in November expressing 
sympathy and friendship "with the Faithful and the people of East 
Timor who are being deluged by most bitter trials both physically 
and spiritually" . 
The open letter marks an important turning point for the 
Indonesian Catholic Church , the first time it has publicly 
expressed concern for the situation in East Timor, and in terms 
that can enly be interpreted as being strongly critical of events 
there, especially since the offensive launched by Indonesian 
troops last August. 
The letter was drawn up after the Bishops had obtained a first-
hand report from Monsignor Carlos Filipe Ximenes Belo, the 
newly appointed Apostolic Administrator of Dili who attended 
the Indonesian Bishops' Conference last November as an 
observer. Shortly before his visit to Jakarta, Mgr Belo had been 
*This should read Rudjito . 
Indonesian F-SE Tiger jets. Two F -SEs are reported to be operating in East 
Timor 
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East Timar 
warned in writing by the military authorities in Dili after a sermon 
he delivered in Dili protesting against arrests and violence being 
perpetrated by Indonesian troops. 
The open letter from the Indonesian .Bishops said: 
. . . we cannot refuse to confront the events that are happening among 
the people, especially those affairs which determine the welfare or the 
misery of the masses who are involved in or who are the victims of cruel 
oppression. 
In a remark which clearly aimed at distancing the Indonesian 
Catholic Church from the policies of the Indonesian state, the 
Bishops reiterated their belief that the Church "must in no way be 
confused with the political community nor bound to any political 
power" . 
Pope cancels visit to Indonesia 
According to the National Catholic Reporter (US) (24 February 
1984), the Pope's decision to cancel a planned visit to Indonesia 
during a tour he is making in May to several countries in Asia was 
strongly influenced by the general human rights situation in 
Indonesia and was prompted primarily by the move taken by the 
Indonesian Bishops to express concern publicly about the 
situation in East Timor . 
UN Human Rights Commission again backs East Timor 
Though no public announcement is yet available , T APOL has 
been informed that the UN Human Rights Commission again 
took a stand in support of East Timor at its meeting in Geneva in 
February 1984. The meeting heard testimony on the present 
situation from the former Bishop of Dili, Mgr Martinhu da Costa 
Lopez and from a representative of Pax Romana . 
The State Departnient's latest distortions on 
EastTinior 
In a report on human rights practices in Indonesia in 1983, the US 
State Department casts doubt on the authenticity of secret 
Indonesian army documents issued to troops in East Timor which 
Amnesty International used last year to expose torture practices, 
and provides a grossly distorted account of developments in East 
Timor before and since Indonesia launched its current offensive 
there last August. 
The report is part of the annual Country Reports on Human 
Rights Practices which the State Department is required to 
produce every year before foreign aid disbsursements are 
presented to Congress. 
The Indonesia chapter devotes considerable attention to the 
"mystery" killings of "criminals". Indeed, the Reagan 
administration and several other western governments have 
expressed concern to Indonesia over the killings, but have been 
conspicuously silent over the current aggression in East Timor. 
The State Department report reinforces the impression that there 
is a move in the West to make an issue of the killings, while not 
allowing western concern over this aspect of General Benny 
Murdani's policy to undermine Indonesia's attempt to crush 
resistance in East Timor. 
The brief references in the report to East Timor conceal the 
fact that the current offensive had been in preparation for several 
months before it was launched last August, and allege that Fretilin 
was responsible for the breakdown of the ceasefire. The massacre 
of about 200 people near Viqueque is dismissed as a "charge" by 
"groups outside Indonesia hostile to the takeover". The 
withdrawal of facilities to the International Red Cross (ICRC) as 
a result of which major relief projects had to be abandoned, 
ensuring the agency's absence from mainland East Timor outside 
Dili, is said in the Report to have occurred in August, whereas it 
happened in July, before the ceasefire was broken . This is crucial 
evidence that Indonesia was preparing military operations well 
before August. 
As for the damning Amnesty International press release issued 
on 20 July 1983 exposing the existence of secret Indonesian army 
documents which include instructions on torture, the State 
Department ignored this altogether. It alleged instead that the 
documents were first exposed by T APOL, "a strong critic of the 
Indonesian government". To have mentioned Amnesty 
International as the organisation which authenticated the 
documents as genuine would have made it impossible for the State 
Department to write without comment that 
Indonesian officials denied the authenticity of the document 
suggesting it was a forgery designed to sway international opinion 
about East Timor. There is no evidence of the authenticity of the 
document. 
Linking T APOL rather than Amnesty with forgery serves 
State Department purposes better. T APOL has for years been 
used as a bogy by Washington to warn members of Congress not 
to take issue with US support for Indonesia's invasion and 
aggression in East Timor. 
Death-squads 
The following extracts are from a report 
written by an anonymous ex-patriate living 
in one of the smaller cities of Indonesia: 
I was on my way to my office when a friend 
told me: "There's another one". I knew 
what he meant. Another dead body, 
allegedly a criminal, killed brutally by the 
government's semi-secret death-squads. 
"Where?" I asked. "In the cemetery, a few 
minutes' walk from here." 
The body was covered with dust. Blood 
was coming from his ears and nose. He had 
choked to death. His face was grim and 
pale . From the expression, one could easily 
see how he had suffered before he died. 
The body was laid out near a village market, 
about 50 metres from a primary school, so 
many schoolboys still in uniform went and 
looked at the corpse . It was a kind of 
attraction for them, as well as for adults 
... The body was shot in the head. I could 
see a bullet wound under his right eye. He 
was in his twenties, still very young. There 
was a lot of blood round his head. People 
were making jokes around the dead body . 
They were used to this kind of scene. After 
a while, police and people from the village 
administration came to bury the body. I 
asked one of the policemen whether the 
body had been identified. He answered: 
person . The man was from the staff of a 
neighbourhood village administration . He 
has been looking for the dead man since 
morning. He had been arrested the night 
before, and was known as the organiser of 
cattle thefts. He had many children and 
seemed to know that he would be arrested 
so had not been sleeping at home ... One 
could see from the victim's clothes that he 
was a poor man. Maybe , I thought, he had 
to steal in order to feed his children, but 
now he had paid with his life. 
Just like four days ago, people were 
standing round the body making jokes 
about corpses. About 100 metres away was 
a junior high school. Teenagers still in 
uniform were hanging around. You could 
see they were quite used to such things. I 
too was less shocked than on my first 
experience a few days ago. 
This was the second time I had seen such 
a thing. The first was about 4 days before . 
"We don't need to. He's obviously a 
criminal. We've already had instructions to 
bury him" . Just like a dead dog. 
Today'.s case was different. A man on a 
motorbike came and said he knew the dead 
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British artns sales to Indonesia 
In addition to the Hawk ground attack aircraft provided for the 
Indonesian airforce , Britain has also supplied ABRI with 
different types of armoured vehicles . Already , there are 65 
Saladin armoured cars , 60 Saracen armoured personnel carriers, 
and 60 Ferret-Scout armoured cars operational in Indonesia , and 
there may be more on the way . In late 1982, documents were 
leaked from the Department of Overseas Development which 
revealed that export credit guarantees were being arranged to 
fund further supplies of armoured vehicles to the Suharto regime 
(TAPOL Bulletin No. 55 , 1983) . 
According to reports on the latest military offensive in East 
Tim or, armoured vehicles· are being used there by Indonesian 
forces, and there is no reason why British vehicles could not be 
and are not part of that offensive . Certainly the specifications of 
the Saladin, Saracen and Ferret-Scout suggest that they would be 
suitable for use in East Tim or, even if in less varied terrain than 
the French AMX tanks supplied by Holland which certainly are in 
actjon there. 
The ' Sdiadin is a fast, rugged armoured car, with six driven 
wheels which give it good cross-country mobility, and enable it to 
function even ·after the loss of a wheel from mine damage. It is 
armed with a 76mm gun in a turret, and may carry either anti-tank 
or anti"personnel ammunition. The Saracen is designed to carry 
and protect up to ten troops in a combat area, and is usually armed 
with one or more 7.62mm machine guns. It is based on the same 
resilient and mobile construction as the Saladin. The Ferret-Scout 
is much smaller and faster than either the Saladin or the Saracen 
and can be used in a variety of terrain , including the provision fo; 
crossing areas of deep water. It is usually armed with a 7.62 
machine gun, but may also carry missiles . 
MPs express concern 
The possibility that British armoured vehicles are being used in 
East Timor has aroused concern among some MPs, who have 
raised the issue in the House of Commons. On 7th March, Mr 
Robert Parry, MP for Riverside, asked the Secretary of State for 
Ferret-Scout 
Saladin 
Foreign Affairs what assurances were sought before the sale of 
armoured vehicles about the uses to which they would be put. Sir 
Bernard Braine MP and Lord Avebury have also written to the 
Foreign Office about the same issue. The Foreign Office reply 
contained some questionable points: 
1) That the British vehicles "can only operate on roads and in 
reasonably dry, open country. Their usefulness in the jungle 
and difficult terrain of East Timor would therefore appear to 
be limited". 
2) That the sale of most of the British armoured vehicles took 
place before 1979, under a Labour government, and it 
therefore could not comment on assurances made then. 
3) Th.at "We do not normally seek assur-ances which can offer no 
reliable guarantee about the uses to which the equipment 
might later be put" . 
On the first point, there are large areas of East Timor which 
have a number of roads, and country in which armoured vehicles 
can, and in fact do operate. They are an important part of 
Indonesia's forces of occupation, the illegality and brutality of 
which the British government is well aware. On the second point, 
since Britain is planning to sell more armoured vehicles to 
Indonesia, it is necessary to know what assurances would be 
sought from Indonesia before such a sale takes place. On the third 
point, if the guarantees given by the Indonesian regi~e are 
regarded as useless, how is it possible for the Foreign Office to 
claim that human rights are taken into consideration before arms 
are supplied? 
Stop Press 
As we were going to press, we received a report that three second-
hand ~rigates from the British Navy are due to be exported to In-
don~sta soon. The "Zulu" and "Gurkha" plus another frigate, ac-
cordmg to one source, fired their last guns under the British flag in 
Portsmouth recently, before setting sale for Indonesia. The ves-
sels are said to be 20 years old. 
We hope to report more about this in the next Bulletin . 
West Papua: The Obliteration 
of a People 
Price: £2.50 plus postage 50 pence (UK, Europe 
and overseas surface): £2.00 (overseas air). 
Please send payment with order. 
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Murdani at ho1ne and abroad. • • 
With President Suharto, reviewing the 1983 Armed Fprces display in 
Jakarta. 
With Lieutenant-General Ershad, President and Defence Minister of 
Bangladesh, during a visit to Bangladesh, 26-28 February 1984. 
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With Vietnam's Defence Minister, Van Tien 
Dung, reviewing troops during a visit to Hanoi in 
February 1984. Murdani said recently in Jakarta 
that Vietnam's invasion of Cambodia was "a ques-
tion of national survival, not of territorial ambi-
tion" and sympathised with countries like Viet-
nam and Israel "which are surrounded by hostile 
powers and tend to take an aggressive geopolitical 
stance". (Far Eastern Economic Review, 29th 
March 1984.) 
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Document 
KOPKAMTIB regulations on 
job perntits for ex-tapols 
The following document is a set of instructions from KO PKAMTI B, the security-intelligence command in Central Java and Jogjakarta on how 
to control the employment of ex-tapols. It sets out a long complex of procedures and regulations which must be complied.with by both 
prospective employers and employees. Any such procedure would normally be fraught with bureaucratic complications and extra costs. Add to 
that the stigma of being an ex-tapol, and the incredibly detailed regulations in this document, and it is clear that the prospects of emp/oy~ent and 
a trouble-free life for ex-tapols have been put out of reach by yet more harassment from the military. . 
The implications of this telegram are already being realised in Java, as reports are received of people being dismissed from their jobs because of 
official pressure on their employees. Five teachers, ex-tapols, in Sragen and twenty more in Klaten have /rut their jobs as a result of the 
instruction, and an Indonesian language teacher was dismissed from his SMA (secondary school) because the Mayor of Surabaya wrote to the 
school concerning his being an ex-prisoner. 
TELEGRAM FROM: COMMANDER OF THE OPERATIONAL 
COMMAND FOR THE RESTORATION OF SECURITY AND 
ORDER (KOPKAMTIB}--CENTRAL JAVA AND JOGJAKARTA 
IMMEDIATE AND SECRET 
From the Special Executive Officer/Commander of the Regional 
KOPKAMTIB 
To: All sub-regional commanders. 
Heads of Social/Political Directors in Central Java and 
Jogjakarta. 
Copies to: (the list includes assistants for territorial military 
affairs, Provincial Governor, Chief of Police, Public Prosecutor, 
Chairman of the High Court of Central Java, and officials in 
charge of provincial education, information, religious and health 
affairs, and the heads of second-level administrations throughout 
Central Java and Jogjakarta) . 
Number 226/KamdaN/1983 30May1983 
A . Basics 
1. Instruction from the Minister ·of the Interior no. 32, 1981 
and Technical Guide no. 730351/421 on the guidance and 
control of ex-G30S/PKI prisoners, both tried and untried. 
2. Radiogram from the Commander of KOPKAMTIB no. TR 
112/KOPKAMN/1983 TWP 0511 1430 hours on 
decree for granting permits for ex/G30S/PKI prisoners to work 
as teachers/lecturers, doctors, priests/preachers, dalang 
(puppeteers), lawyers (Legal Aid Institute), journalists, 
writers/publishers, and so on. 
B.In compliance with Basics (2) above, permits for ex-G30S/PKI 
people to engage in activities as teachers/lecturers, doctors, 
priests/preachers, dalang (puppeteers), lawyers (LBH), 
journalists, writers, publishers, and so on, shall be issued by 
the Special Executive Officer for the Region after careful 
investigation of the good intentions and conduct record of the 
ex/G30S/PKI prisoner in question. 
C. The issue of such a permit shall not mean that these persons 
may become a government employee or an eJilployee of a state 
corporation, or of other vital enterprises . 
D For the Region of Central Java and Jogjakarta, applications for 
be made as follows: 
1. The application shall be addressed to the Special Executive 
Officer/Commander of Regional KOPKAMTIB for the 
attention of the Assistant for Territorial Affairs, and shall be 
authorised by: 
a. Official in charge of social/political affairs of second-level 
administration 
b. Commander of the local district command 
c. Head of the local department or office concerned 
2. The good conduct record, whether issued by the village or 
lurah*, shall be authorised by: 
a. Head of the sub-district ( camat) 
b. Commander of the sub-district military command 
(Koramil) 
c. A letter confirming good conduct from the local chief of 
police. 
3. The prisoner's release document and certificate of 
classification/category, authorised by: 
a. Village head or lurah 
b. Sub-district chief (camat) 
c. Head of social/political affairs office of second-level 
administration in question 
4. For those persons who have never been detained, and who 
have no certificate of classification or category, a declaration 
from the village head 'or lurah confirming the person's 
involvement in the G30S/PKI, ** authorised by: 
a. Village head or lurah 
b. Sub-district chief (camat) 
c. Head of social/political affairs office of second-level 
administration in question. 
5. A declaration of approval or of non-objection from the 
Department or Directorate head in question, and a letter from 
the Head of District ( bupati) or Mayor, declaring that there are 
no objections to the person in question taking up a profession 
in their area. 
6. Each permit shall remain in force for only two years, 
whereafter it must be renewed and a new application 
submitted to the Special Executive Officer of the Regional 
KOPKAMTIB, with the following attachments: 
a. the previous permit 
b. all the documents specified in points 1. to 5. above. 
E. The application shall be submitted in triplicate by the individual 
in question personally to the Special Executive Officer/ 
Commander of KOPKAMTIB for the attention of the 
Assistant for Territorial Affairs for the Region of Central Java 
and Jogjakarta; no intermediary may be used. 
F. Whichever official to whom the application is addressed shall 
immediately check and investigate the said ex-G30S/PKI 
prisoner who has already taken up a profession as under B. 
above or who has already set up a company etc, whether with 
or without a permit or recommendation from the· Special 
Executive Officer/Commander of KOPKAMTIB for Central 
Java and Jogjakarta, in order that the permit or renewal may 
be issued in accordance with point D. subsections 1. to 6. 
above, and those who are practising without a permit from the 
Special Executive Officer/Commander of KOPOKAMTIB for 
Central Java and Jogjakarta shall be deemed to have 
committed a breach, and their occupation shall be stopped. 
G.This cable is an instruction and is to be used as the directive for 
guidance and control of ex-G30S/PKI people and as an 
intensification of SP3 BAKOM(?) 
The end. 
Telegram sent by Brigadier-General Sarwono 
Commander of the Operational 
Command for the Restoration of 
Security and Order 
(KOPKAMTIB) in Central Java 
and Jogjakarta 
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Ex-tapols 
Beware of latent 
com.m.unists, warn generals 
The two top army generals in Indonesia have issued public warnings about the "latent 
danger" of communism in society, whilst a third has warned that social problems are 
becoming so critical that even minor incidents could havefar-reaching consequences. 
Murdani: Revitalise 
vigilance, Rewrite history 
Armed Forces commander-in-chief, 
General Benny Murdani, used the occasion 
of a National Vigilance Course for 
businessmen to warn the Indonesian nation 
to revitalise vigilance against communism. 
Although communist teachings were 
constitutionally outlawed, he said, the 
communists never stop struggling1 People 
tend to think that, siqce the G30S/PKI was 
crushed in 1965, communism no longer 
poses a problem. This is completely wrong. 
Even in present-day conditions of calm and 
stability, they adjust their struggle and are 
trying to make a comeback. 
He then turned his wrath on history 
books which state that the 1926~27 revolt 
against Dutch colonialism was led by 
communists. History must be rewritten, he 
said, because this is not what happened. It 
was a people's revolt, not a communist 
revolt. There may have been some 
communists in it but the people revolted 
because they hated the Dutch government, 
not because they accepted communist 
ideas . Communists have never made any 
contributi.on to .the national struggle; all 
they have done is to cause tragedies and 
bloodshed. (Sinar Harapan, 27 February 
1984.) 
General Rudini: Purge the 
Armed Forces 
The second military leader to sound the 
alarms was General Rudini (promoted to 
full general rank on 1 March) , the chief-of-
staff of the Army, who issued an instruction 
in February to all ranks "to purge the 
Indonesian army of G30S/PKI remnants" , a 
task which one would have thought had 
been completed many years ago. General 
Rudini however is not satisfied, hence his 
order to subordinates to carry out this 
instruction "with intensity" and "with a 
sense of responsibility". The tasks must be 
completed by the end of March 1984. The 
danger of communist infiltration arises, he 
said , because communists have been 
returned to the community (a reference 
presumably to. the release in the late 1970s 
of political prisoners) and they were again 
mingling with people in everyday life. 
(Sinar Harapan, 2 March , 1984.) 
Lieutenant-General Y ogie 
Memet: Unrest and the 
Social Order 
As for Lieutenant-General Yogie 
Memet, commander of the Territory of 
Java and Madura ( Kowilhan II), he warned 
in a speech at a gathering of the journalists 
association, PWI, that population density in 
his territory had become critical. Efforts to 
solve this by transmigration did not yet 
match up to the size of the problem and 
urbanisation was proceeding · at an 
uncontrollable level. Living conditions in 
the .countrys,ide were now approaching 
'subsistence ievel' and the slightest unrest 
could lead to social and economic problems 
of unpredictable consequences,· often 
assuming a religious or ideological guise. 
"But the dynamics that lead to security 
problems almost always originate from 
people in the lower strata of the middle class 
whose own economic circumstances are not 
bad but who turn their attention to 
'conceptual matters' such as democracy, 
human rights, and freedom of speech and 
justice. " (Sinar Harapan, 2 February 1984.) 
Ex-Prisoners Blamed for Unrest over 
Forced Cultivation 
Ex-PKI member gets 11 years for murder 
A bitter dispute in a group of villages in the district of Ciamis in 
the south of West Java has led to charges being made that the 
protest has been instigated by former political prisoners. The 
charge was made in banner headlines in several Jakarta dailies , 
but nothing is substantiated and no details of the people said to be 
responsible have been made public. 
The dispute concerns several thousand hectares of land which 
have been tilled since 1963 by about 12,000 peasants. The lands 
were forinerly owned by plantations but handed over to peasants 
for cultivation after being left unused for a long period. In 1979, 
the peasants were told the land would become part of a nucleus 
plantation project for the cultivation of hybrid coconut. Initially, 
they were told that only land currently not being tilled would be 
converted , but when the bulldozers came in to prepare the land 
for its new role, the entire area was flattened; their standing crops 
and orchards of valuable clove trees were completely destroyed . 
Then the peasants were told that they would be required to 
cultivate the new crop for State Plantation XIII which meant that, 
at a stroke, they had been turned from peasants working land on 
their own account into labourers for the state plantation. 
Protests took many forms, including actions to pull up stakes 
that had been knocked into the land to demark areas for 
cultivation. A number of people were arrested by the local 
military, and the peasants recently asked the Legal Aid Institute 
to help them fight this arbitrary seizure of land and the forced 
cultivation of cash crops. 
The Ciamis military district commander denied that peasants 
had been arrested. They had only been taken in for questioning 
and later released, he said, and the Army had intervened because 
there was reason to believe that the protest movement was 
instigated by former communist political prisoners living in the 
two villages involved. (Tempo, 21January, 1984.) 
Ngiso Adiwahano, an employee at the Department of Labour 
who confessed to murdering an official at the Department for 
repeatedly taunting him as an "ex-PKI" has been found guilty and · 
sentenced to 11 years' imprisonment . He told the court he had 
repeatedly asked his victim to stop harassing him like this , but the 
man persisted . 
The accused said in court that he had been a member of the 
PKI but was never detained after 1965, and had been rehabilitated 
many years ago. 
(Sinar Harapan , 10 March, 1984.) 
Merdeka Sablu, 21 Januari 1984 
Menmud Hasrul Harahap Tinja:J Pirbun V Banten Selatan 
Ada Seke~omµok Eks 
Tapol Ruru Mencoba 
Pengaruhi Rakyat 
Serang, Jumat,-
M:!nteri Muda Urusan Peningkatan Produksi Tanaman 
Kerns (UPPTK), Ir Hasrul Harahap menekankan pentingnya 
keterbukaan, kcwajaran dan kebersamaan dalam mengelola 
proyek PIRBUN V Banten Sela.tan. Tetapi diingatkan pula 
agar selalu waspada terhadap oknum pengacau yang berusaha 
"A group of ex Boru tapols are trying to influence people" , says the 
headline. But the item, 50cms long, devotes only one sentence to this claim, 
and not a shred of proof. 
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Regional Cou·ncil on 
Human Rights in Asia 
On 9th December 1983, the Asian Regional Council on Human 
Rights held its first general assembly in Jakarta, to discuss the 
scale of human rights abuses in ASEAN countries , and to draw up 
a set of principles on which governments in the region should act. 
The Council was formed in February 1982 at the suggestion of 
human rights campaigner Yap Thiam Hien . Present at the 
assembly were Buyung Nasution and Mulya Lubis of the Jakarta 
Legal Aid Institute, Philippines opposition leader Jose Diokno, 
and Thongbai Thongpao, a journalist and lawyer from Thailand, 
among others from ASEAN countries . It is no surprise that in its 
concluding statement, the Council noted "with regreJ, that the 
state of human rights in the ASEAN region leaves much to be 
desired". 
The Council did not hide the fact that it felt that ASEAN 
governments deliberately ignored the basic rights of the people 
they purported to represent, and it drew attention to violations of 
these rights in Indonesia, particularly to the extra-judicial killings 
by the military which still terrorise the population. What gains had 
been made on the human rights front, the Council said , 
are more the result of government tolerance, sometimes under 
pressure from foreign governments or world opinion, or of action by 
people's organisations, than of a sincere recognition by the authorities 
concerned of the rights of the people. And the gains have been 
outweighed by shocking examples in some countries; for instance in 
Indonesia, the summary extra-judicial executions of persons suspected 
of being common criminals. 
The Council's "Declaration of the Basic Duties of ASEAN 
Peoples and Governments" is a detailed document which covers 
all areas of human rights which might be, and often are, violated 
by the regimes and governments of the region . Statements of 
principle and conduct in the Declaration are quite specific, and in 
direct contradiction to actual government practice . For instance, 
the Council stated that: 
It is the duty of the government to refrain from using education as an 
instrument of propaganda. 
In times of peace military expenditures shall not exceed expenditures 
for education or health . 
It is the duty of government to review its land policies with a view to 
restoring all ancestral lands belonging to cultural communities to the 
tribe. 
Of course the Council has set itself an ambitious task in 
detailing so many areas of human rights violations, and to state 
the problem is .still a long way from solving it. All members of the 
Council would probably find themselves in conflict with the 
governments they exhort to observe these rights, every time they 
sought to defend them. They concluded their statement with a 
significant comment: 
To work for human rights is not only to combat instances of injustice. It 
is also to seek to change structures tha't exploit not merely individuals 
and peoples , but nature itself. One such structure is authoritarian 
government, which denies the right of peoples to participate in making 
decisions that affect their lives and the future of their children . 
Governments in the region are repressive precisely because 
they wish to prevent their structures being changed, and to 
prevent people from participating in decision making which might 
change those structures. But it is a measure of notable progress 
that there is now such an organisation dedicated to facing all issues 
of human rights in ASEAN countries, something which countries 
like Indonesia so badly need . 
The war against East Timor 
by Carmel Budiardjo and Liem Soei Liong 
A history of Indonesia's war of aggression in East Timar 
and of the stunning resurgence of the resistance movement 
under Fretilin's leadership following the heavy defeats of 
1977178. The book also analyses efforts to Indonesianise 
the military regime's "27th Province" politically, economi-
cally and socially, and describes conditions in the resettle-
ment camps created by the forces of occupation for pur-
poses of population control. 
Nine secret counter-insurgency documents of the In-
donesian Army are reproduced at length in an Appendix . 
Published by ZED Press. 
Publication date: May 1984. 
185 pages, with photographs. 
Probable price: £4.50. 
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